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Confidential Arbitration of
Whistleblower Actions: A Loophole
That Could Effectively Undo
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Guyden v. Aetna, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Fall 2001, the American people and the American business community
were shaken to their core, not only by deplorable acts carried out by foreign ter-
rorists, but also by deplorable acts carried out by what amounted to domestic ter-
rorists with MBAs. Throughout the fall of 2001 and early 2002, the financial
world was attempting to process the massive accounting frauds that transpired at
Enron and WorldCom, eventually leading to the collapse of each company. 2 Con-
gress responded swiftly, enacting the Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act of 2002, more commonly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 ("SOX"). 3 SOX, which has its fair share of critics, attempts to ensure
that corporate disasters like the ones at Enron and WorldCom will never again
have such a devastating effect on the American economy. 4
Among SOX's many requirements and protections are protections for whis-
tleblowers, the Sherron Watkins' and Cynthia Coopers' of the world,5 who are the
first to take risks to alert others of a potential fraud. These whistleblowers nor-
mally would be able to utilize the court system to vindicate their rights in the
event of a retaliatory employment action. Recently, however, employers have
begun using mandatory arbitration agreements to keep potentially embarrassing
whistleblower actions out of the court system. Guyden v. Aetna, Inc. is a recent
Second Circuit case that examined the enforceability of such agreements, ulti-
mately holding that whistleblower claims under SOX can be heard in confidential
arbitration proceedings.
6
1. 544 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2008).
2. See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GuYs IN THE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (Penguin Group 2004); Simon Romero & Riva D.
Atlas, WorldCom's Collapse: The Overview; WorldCom files for Bankruptcy, Largest U.S. Case, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2002, available at http:llwww.nytimes.com/2002/07/22/us/worldcom-s-collapse-the-
overview-worldcom-files-for-bankruptcy-argest-us-case.htm?partner-rssnyt&emc=rss (last visited
Mar. 30, 2009).
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15
& 18 U.S.C.).
4. See generally Michael F. Holt, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: COSTS, BENEFITS AND BUSINESS
IMPACTS (CIMA Publishing 2008).
5. See Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year: Cynthia Cooper, Coleen Rowley
and Sherron Watkins, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 30. Sherron Watkins and Cynthia Cooper blew the
whistle on massive accounting fraud at Enron and WorldCom, respectively. Id.
6. 544 F.3d 376, 384 (2d Cir. 2008).
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IT. FACTS AND HOLDING
A. Guyden 's Employment and Initial Concerns with Aetna's Internal
Controls Methods
In December 2003, Aetna, Inc. offered Linda Guyden a position as Director
of Aetna's Internal Audit Department ("the Department").7 As part of the applica-
tion process, Guyden submitted a signed application stating that any offer of em-
ployment from Aetna was conditioned upon Guyden's agreement to use Aetna's
mandatory arbitration program to solve any "employment-related legal disputes."
8
In addition to the employment application's arbitration provision, Guyden's offer
letter also included an arbitration provision.9 Guyden accepted Aetna's offer and
began her employment in January 2004.10
Shortly after beginning her employment, Guyden began to encounter prob-
lems with the Department, describing it as "ineffective, demoralized, and without
independence or objectivity."11 Based upon her evaluation of the Department and
its procedures, Guyden believed Aetna was in danger of violating SOX.12 Specif-
ically, she was concerned that the ineffectiveness of the internal audit department
would "become a material weakness in the company's internal controls."1
Guyden initially attempted to remedy the problem internally by rehabilitating
the Department. 14 In an effort to acquire the resources and authority necessary to
effectively implement the desired changes to the Department, Guyden approached
Aetna senior management, requesting that she be allowed to bring in an outside
auditor to restructure the department.1 5 Aetna's senior management did not agree
with Guyden's plans; so, in Spring 2004, Guyden approached Aetna CFO Alan
Bennett directly to help her remedy the situation, but she was unsatisfied with his
response.16
When Guyden found the responses from Aetna's CFO and other members of
senior management lacking, she voiced her concerns directly to Aetna's Chairman
& CEO John Rowe, President Ron Williams, and General Counsel Lou Briskman
7. Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., No. 3:05cv1652, 2006 WL 2772695, at *1 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2006).
Aetna is "one of the nation's leading diversified health care benefits companies, serving members with
information and resources to help them make better informed decisions about their health care." Aetna
Web site, http://www.aetna.comabout/index.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
8. Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., 544 F.3d 376, 380 (2d Cir. 2008). The arbitration provision of the appli-
cation read: "I understand that if I am offered employment that begins on or after January 1, 2003, a
condition of the offer and my acceptance of that offer is that I agree to use Aetna's mandatory/binding
arbitration program rather than the courts to resolve my employment-related legal disputes." Guyden,
2006 WL 2772695, at *1.
9. Guyden, 544 F.3d at 380. The offer letter stated "[t]his offer and [Guyden's] acceptance of that
offer also are contingent upon [her] agreement to use the Company's mandatory/binding arbitration
program rather than the courts to resolve employment-related legal disputes." Id
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during a meeting with the three executives.1 7 One week after meeting with Rowe,
Williams, and Briskman, Guyden received a poor performance review, which
stood in stark contrast to the positive review she received one month earlier.'
8
Following the meeting and poor performance review, Aetna eventually al-
lowed Guyden to bring in an outside auditor to examine Aetna's internal con-
trols.19 The auditor's report was distributed to Aetna executives one week after
the audit committee held its regularly scheduled September meeting. 20 Because
Guyden was unable to discuss the auditor's findings at the September meeting,
she planned on using the audit committee meeting on December 2, 2004, to dis-
cuss the results of the audit and present the auditor's report. 2  Ten days prior to
the December meeting, however, Aetna terminated Guyden. 22  Following her
termination, Guyden requested to speak at the December meeting of the audit
committee, but the committee denied her request.
23
B. The Arbitration Agreement(s)
In April of 2004, well before her meeting with Rowe, Briskman, and Wil-
lams, Guyden signed a stock incentive agreement that contained yet another man-
datory arbitration agreement.24 This arbitration agreement provided that "all em-
ployment-related legal disputes between [Guyden and Aetna] will be submitted to
and resolved by binding arbitration.... ,25 The agreement allowed only limited
pre-hearing discovery, consisting of a "deposition of one person and anyone des-
ignated by the other as an expert witness," the opportunity to submit one set of ten
written questions, and the opportunity to "obtain all documents on which the other
party relies in support of its answers to written questions. The agreement stated
that further discovery may be permitted by the arbitrator "upon a showing that it is
necessary for that party to have a fair opportunity to present a claim or defense. 27
The agreement also contained a confidentiality clause mandating that all proceed-
ings, including the final decision of the arbitrator, would be "private and confiden-
17. Id. at 379-80. The meeting between Guyden, Mr. Rowe, Mr. Williams and Mr. Briskman oc-
curred on August 16, 2004. Id.






24. Id. The agreement was signed on April 22, 2004. Id. Guyden has previously agreed to a manda-
tory arbitration provision as part of her original acceptance of employment with Aetna. Id.
25. Id. at 381. The arbitration agreement did not include workers' compensation claims, unemploy-
ment compensation claims, and ERISA claims. Id. The agreement also states that any disputes as to
what it covers are to be decided by the arbitrator, and that any arbitration will be administered by the





Eckelkamp: Eckelkamp: Confidential Arbitration of Whistleblower Actions
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
tial. '28 Additionally, the agreement provided that the final decision of the arbitra-
tor would be "in writing with a brief summary of the arbitrator's decision. ' 29
C. Procedural History and Parties' Positions
Within ninety days of her termination, Guyden filed an administrative com-
plaint with the Secretary of Labor. 30 After 180 days, the Department of Labor had
taken no action, and Guyden filed suit against Aetna in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Connecticut. 31 Shortly after Guyden filed her complaint, Aetna
moved to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration in light of the signed arbi-
tration agreements.32 Guyden opposed Aetna's motion to dismiss, arguing that
SOX whistleblower claims were "categorically nonarbitrable" and that the arbitra-
tion process would "prevent her from vindicating her statutory rights."33 The
district court granted the motion to compel arbitration, holding that there was no
inherent conflict between arbitration and the purposes of SOX and that the charac-
teristics of the agreements did not render the process unfair.34
Guyden appealed the district court decision, arguing that under federal law,
SOX whistleblower claims cannot be subject to arbitration because mandatory
arbitration of whistleblower claims is at odds with the policy objectives behind
SOX.35 Guyden further argued that the agreement, if enforced, would leave her
unable to vindicate her statutory rights. 36 Specifically, she claimed that the brief
summary provision would prevent effective appellate review of the decision and
that the agreement did not provide for sufficient discovery.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, holding that
the retaliation claim under the SOX whistleblower protection provision was arbi-
trable and that the challenges to the confidentiality clause, the brief summary pro-
vision, and the limited discovery provision were precluded.38 As a result, the
complaint was dismissed and Aetna's motion to compel arbitration was granted.39
28. Id. The confidentiality clause reads as follows: "All proceedings, including the arbitration hear-
ing and decision, are private and confidential, unless otherwise required by law. Arbitration decisions
may not be published or publicized without the consent of both the Grantee and the Company." Id. at
384.
29. Id. at 381.
30. Id. at 380. The complaint alleged that Guyden was terminated in violation of the SOX whistleb-
lower protection provision. Id In pursuing a whistleblower termination action under Sectionl514A of
the SOX, the wronged employee must file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor for review. 18
U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1) (2006).
31. See Guyden v. Aetna Inc., No. 3:05cv1652, 2006 WL 2772695, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2006).
32. Guyden v. Aetna Inc., 544 F.3d 376, 380 (2d Cir. 2008).
33. Id. at 381.
34. See Guyden, 2006 WL 2772695, at *5-*8.
35. Guyden, 544 F.3d at 381-82. Guyden claims that the SOX whistleblower protections exist not
just to establish a private cause of action, but also to enable whistleblowers to act as a "private attorney
general" in carrying news of accounting irregularities to the general public. Id.
36. Id. at 382.
37. Id. at 384.
38. Id. at 385-87.
39. Id. at 387.
[Vol. 2009
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Federal Arbitration Act
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") governs the enforceability of arbitration
agreements between employers and employees. 40 The FAA represents an embo-
diment of the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements," which has
been interpreted to mean that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable is-
sues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a
like defense to arbitrability.' '4  The FAA provides that arbitration agreements
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist in
law or equity for the revocation of any contract., 42 District courts do not have
discretion in granting motions to compel arbitration under the FAA, as the Su-
preme Court has held that the FAA requires district courts to compel arbitration of
arbitrable claims upon a motion by one party.43 In the absence of grounds which
would allow for the revocation of the contractual agreement, the agreement to
arbitrate must be enforced. 44 While the FAA discusses enforceability in terms of
contract law, it makes no mention of the effect of federal legislation, such as SOX,
on an agreement to arbitrate.45
B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002'
SOX brought about a host of changes to corporate auditing and governance in
the wake of the creative accounting scandals that rocked the American economy
in late 2001 and early 2002.47 SOX was intended to "protect investors by improv-
ing the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the se-
curities laws" and to regulate the accounting and auditing practices of publicly
48traded companies.
Among the most notable changes was the creation of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB"), a private nonprofit corporation estab-
lished to oversee audits of publicly traded companies, "in order to protect the in-
terests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informa-
tive, accurate, and independent audit reports for companies the securities of which
40. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
41. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
42. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
43. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985); 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006) (providing
that district courts, in the presence of an arbitration agreement, shall direct parties to proceed to arbitra-
tion on arbitrable claims).
44. Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 218.
45. See 9 U.S.C.§2
46. The SOX Act of 2002 is an expansive and wide reaching piece of legislation. This note examines
the act in terms of the whistleblower provision and the overall purpose of the act as a whole. For a
more comprehensive review of the entire act, see TERENCE SHEPPEY & Ross MCGILL, SARBANES-
OXLEY 27-62 (Palgrave Macmillan 2006); see also John Paul Lucci, Enron-The Bankruptcy Heard
Around the World and the International Ricochet Of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REv. 211, 221-34
(2003).
47. Lucci, supra note 46, at 214-16.
48. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 3.
No. 1]
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are sold to, and held by and for, public investors. 49 SOX also requires firms to
prepare an internal control report, which assesses the effectiveness of the firms'
internal control structure, to be included with the firm's annual report.
5 0
In addition, SOX includes a clause designed to protect whistleblowers. 5' The
whistleblower provision prevents any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor,
or agent of a company which falls under SOX's coverage from taking some ad-
verse employment action or otherwise discriminating against an employee who
alerts superiors or government authorities to possible violations of federal securi-
ties regulations, including SOX.52 If an employee wishes to pursue an action un-
der the whistleblower provision, he or she must file a complaint with the Secretary
of Labor, who has 180 days to pursue an action against a company.53 If, after 180
days, the Secretary has not taken action, the plaintiff may file a lawsuit in the
appropriate district court of the United States. 54 The statute also provides damag-
es in the event of a favorable judgment for the plaintiff, awarding make-whole
relief.55 SOX makes no mention of punitive damages, or damages of any kind to
compensate for harm to investors at large.56
The whistleblower provision of SOX does not proscribe alternative forms of
adjudicating claims.57 Prior to passing the final version of SOX, both the Senate
and House of Representatives separately rejected versions of the bill that would
have prevented arbitration agreements from applying to whistleblower claims.58
As a result, the Senate Judiciary Committee amended the bill to remove a provi-
sion proscribing arbitration, effectively leaving issues of arbitrability up to the
courts.
59
C.Assessing the Arbitrability of Federal Statutory Claims
In assessing the arbitrability of statutory claims, courts first examine if the
parties agreed to submit statutory claims to arbitration and second, whether Con-
gress intended for arbitration of rights under the statute to be precluded.60 Ulti-
mately, courts examine the ability of the claimant to vindicate his or her statutory
61
rights through arbitration.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006).
52. Id.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2). Damages include "(A) reinstatement with the same seniority status the
employed would have had, but for the discrimination; (B) the amount of back pay, with interest; and
(C) compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including litiga-
tion costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees." Id.
56. See 18 U.S.C.§ 1514A.
57. See id.
58. See S.2010, 107th Cong. § 1514A(d)(2) (Mar. 12, 2002 version) ("No employee may be com-
pelled to adjudicate his or her rights under this section pursuant to an arbitration agreement"); H.R.
4098, 107th Cong. § 1514A(d)(2) (Apr. 9, 2002, version) (same).
59. S. Rep. No. 107-146, at Pt. V (May 6, 2002). The clear implication of these actions is that Con-
gress did not intend to remove whistleblower provisions generally from arbitration proceedings.
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When examining attempts to stay judicial proceedings pending arbitration in
cases involving a claim arising under a federal statute, the Second Circuit has
articulated a four-prong test.62 Of particular relevance to this case is the prong
mandating that "if federal statutory claims are asserted, [the court] must consider
whether Congress intended those claims to be non-arbitrable. ' '63 The fact that a
claim arises under a statutory right is not itself indicative of Congressional in-
tent.64 The FAA mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory
claims, though it may be overridden by a "contrary congressional command. 65
Still, Congress' expectation in enacting the FAA was that a party that has agreed
to arbitrate a statutory claim would not lose any substantive rights created by the
statute because the agreement merely changes the forum from which the wronged
can obtain relief.66
A party who wishes to prevent enforcement of the arbitration agreement relat-
ing to the statutory claim must show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver
of judicial remedies relating to the statute in question. 67 A Congressional intent to
preclude arbitration under a particular statute will be apparent from the text of the
statute or its legislative history, or alternatively, from an "inherent conflict be-
tween arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes. 6 8
D. Vindication of Statutory Rights
In 1985, the Supreme Court ruled that arbitration of federal statutory claims
may be appropriate so long as the potential litigant may effectively vindicate his
or her statutory claim in the arbitral forum.69 The Court has elaborated upon and
reaffirmed that ruling many times.70 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
articulated the vindication of statutory rights principle, declaring "[e]ven if an
arbitration clause is broad enough to encompass a statutory claim for which Con-
gress has not precluded arbitration, arbitration will not be compelled if the pros-
62. Oldroyd v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 134 F.3d 72, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1998).
63. Id. The other three prongs of the test are: (1) to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate;
(2) determine the scope of the agreement; and (3) if the court decides that some but not all of the
claims are arbitrable, it must decide whether to stay the balance of the proceedings pending arbitration.
Id.
64. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (holding that actions under
§10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and RICO Act were arbitrable); see also Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (noting that actions under the Sherman Act, the
RICO Act, the Securities Exchange Act or 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 have all
been held to be arbitrable).
65. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 482 U.S. at 226.
66. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
67. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 482 U.S. at 227; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (A party which has made a "bargain to arbitrate should be
held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention" to preclude arbitration of claims under the
statute).
68. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 482 U.S. at 227.
69. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 637.
70. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20; Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90
(2000); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs,. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); but see Hooters of Am., Inc. v.
Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that procedures under arbitration agreement were
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pective litigant cannot effectively vindicate his statutory rights in the arbitral fo-
rum., 71 Though a prospective litigant must have the ability to effectively vindi-
cate his or her statutory rights in the arbitral forum, the arbitral forum does not
necessarily have to provide all of the procedural devices available to litigants at
trial.72
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme Court heard a chal-
lenge to the arbitrability of an employment discrimination claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").73 The plaintiff in Gilmer raised
several challenges to the procedures utilized by the arbitration agreement.74
Among his challenges, the plaintiff alleged that the arbitrator was less impartial
than the court.75 The Supreme Court dismissed this challenge to the agreement,
reasoning that the arbitration agreement in question, based on the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") arbitration rules, contained its own measures to ensure an
unbiased decision maker, such as preemptory challenges of arbitrators and arbitra-
tor disclosure agreements; and as such, the plaintiff was sufficiently able to vindi-
cate his right to an impartial decision maker. 76 Gilmer's second challenge alleged
that the discovery allowed under the arbitration agreement was more limited that
what would have been allowed in the federal courts. 77 The Supreme Court dis-
missed this challenge as well, reasoning that when a party agrees to arbitrate a
claim, he or she trades the procedures of the courts for the "simplicity, informali-
ty, and expedition of arbitration. '78 Gilmer's third challenge alleged an inability
to vindicate his statutory rights; generally speaking, arbitrators will not issue writ-
ten opinions, which would prevent the public from becoming aware of the em-
ployer's discriminatory policies.79 Under the rules in question, the decision of the
arbitrator was, in fact, required to be in writing and available to the public, and as
a result, the Supreme Court dismissed this challenge, reasoning that because
NYSE rules require decisions be in writing and contain the names of parties, arbi-
tration would produce information available to the public in a similar fashion as
would be produced through the courts.
80
The Supreme Court's ultimate holding in Gilmer was that Gilmer was re-
quired to arbitrate his ADEA claim because "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, [an employee] does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute;
[he] only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."8'
Thus, under the arbitration agreement, Gilmer did not lose any substantive rights;
he only lost some of the procedures he would have enjoyed in the courts. In
1997, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit applied this decision to the
arbitrability of a statutory claim under Title VII, summarizing the Supreme
71. In re Cotton Yam Antitrust Litig. 505 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 2007).
72. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999).
73. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20.
74. Id. at 30.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 30-31.
77. Id. at 31.
78. Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymoth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 31-32
81. Id. at 26.
82. Id. at 31-32.
[Vol. 2009
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Court's test.83 The court held that an arbitration agreement would be enforceable
so long as it satisfied the five factors articulated in Gilmer: (1) neutral arbitrators,
(2) more than minimal discovery, (3) requirement of a written award, (4) allows
all types of relief available in court, and (5) does not require employees to pay
unreasonable costs as a condition to the forum.
84
As indicated by the legal history, both the arbitration of statutory claims and
the legal history of SOX are relatively well settled within the law. Clear tests
exist to determine the arbitrability of statutory claims, and the legislative history
of SOX suggests that Congress did not intend to preclude the arbitration of claims
arising out of it. The Second Circuit, in Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., examined one of
the remaining gray areas of this area of law: the confidential arbitration of whis-
tleblower claims under SOX.
85
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., the Second Circuit was faced with the question of
whether or not an employee who claims she was wrongfully terminated as a whis-
tleblower may seek a remedy through the courts, though the employee had agreed
to arbitrate all employment-related disputes on multiple occasions.86 The Second
Circuit analyzed the case in two parts: first, examining the arbitrability of whis-
tleblower claims under SOX, and second, examining whether or not the conditions
of Aetna's arbitration agreement prevented Guyden from vindicating her statutory
rights.87
A. Arbitrability of SOX Whistleblower Claims
Guyden argued that Congress intended SOX whistleblower claims to be non-
arbitrable. 88 Guyden argued that there was an "inherent conflict" between the
purpose of SOX and using arbitration as a means to resolve related disputes.
8 9
The underlying premise of Guyden's argument was that the SOX whistleblower
provision serves a public purpose as much as it does a private one, in that the re-
sulting litigation--relating to retaliatory employment actions-provides a public
record of information regarding the company's fraudulent activities. 90 As support
for this contention, Guyden pointed to the fact that Aetna did not disclose the
accounting irregularities she claimed to have uncovered, and she planned to use
the litigation regarding her termination to alert Aetna shareholders and investors at
large to Aetna's accounting problems.
9
'
83. See Cole v. Bums Inter. Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
84. Id. at 1479-82.
85. Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., 544 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2008).
86. Id. at 379-81.
87. Id. at 382-87.
88. Id. at 382.
89. Id. The Court articulated the general purpose of SOX was "to enforce the accountability and
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While Guyden focused her argument primarily on the purpose underlying
SOX as a whole, the Second Circuit focused heavily on the primary purpose of the
SOX whistleblower protection statute. 92 After reviewing the legislative history of
SOX, the court concluded that the primary purpose of the whistleblower provision
was "to provide a private remedy for the aggrieved employee, not to publicize
alleged corporate misconduct."93 The court reasoned that while the purpose of
SOX as a whole is to "strengthen the integrity of capital markets," the whistleb-
lower provision of SOX had a much narrower purpose-primarily to protect em-
ployees and to "make [the] victim whole." 94 The court said that protections de-
signed to "make [the] victim whole" compensate whistleblowers as private citi-
zens, and "they do little to publicize the conduct of the corporate defendant., 95 In
further support of its conclusion that whistleblower claims are indeed arbitrable,
the court pointed out that the House of Representatives and the Senate separately
rejected versions of the bill that would have explicitly removed all SOX whistleb-
lower claims from arbitration.96 Finally, to further strengthen its conclusion that
the purpose of the SOX whistleblower protection provision is to make the victim
whole, the court focused on the statutory language which provides that an em-
ployee needs only to prove that he or she "'reasonably believed' that the defen-
dant's conduct violated federal law." 97 The court reasoned that because this pro-
vision focused on the plaintiffs mental state, as opposed to the defendant's con-
duct, it was inconsistent with Guyden's argument that the primary purpose of this
whistleblower protection is to publicize corporate malfeasance.
9 8
The Second Circuit concluded that because the whistleblower protection con-
tained in SOX is designed primarily to make the victim whole, and the victim may
be made whole through an arbitration award, the whistleblower provision is "en-
tirely consistent with mandatory arbitration;" 99 and because the purpose of the
whistleblower provision of SOX was consistent with mandatory arbitration, the
whistleblower claims under SOX are arbitrable.
1°°
B. Vindication of Statutory Rights
In addition to Guyden's challenge to the arbitrability of her claim, she also at-
tacked the terms of the agreement.10 1 Guyden objected to the agreement's confi-




96. Id. (citing S.2010, 107th Cong. § 1514A(d)(2) (Mar. 12, 2002 version) ("No employee may be
compelled to adjudicate his or her rights under this section pursuant to an arbitration agreement."); see
also H.R. 4098, 107th Cong. § 1514A(d)(2) (Apr. 19, 2002 version) (same); S. Rep. No. 107-146, at
pt. V (May 6, 2002) (reporting unanimous vote in favor of amendment that removed "provision deal-
ing with arbitration agreements")).
97. Id. at 384 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(l) (2006)).
98. Id.
99. Id. The court did recognize that Guyden will not have the same ability to publicly expose Aet-
na's alleged wrongdoing, but relying on its holding in Oldroyd v. Elmira Say. Bank, 134 F.3d 72 (2d
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dentiality clause, the requirement that the arbitrator's decision be rendered as a
brief written summary, and the limits on discovery.
102
Guyden argued that the confidentiality clause contained in the arbitration
agreement is in conflict with one of the purposes of the SOX whistleblower provi-
sion, in that it would prevent her from "communicat[ing] to other employees that
their rights [would] be protected if they report wrongdoing."'' 0 3 The Second Cir-
cuit acknowledged that a confidentiality agreement in an arbitration provision may
"reduce whatever incentive the fact of publicity instills in potential whistleblow-
ers," though it did not find the issue dispositive. 1°4 The court cited the Fifth Cir-
cuit, reasoning that confidentiality clauses have become so prevalent in arbitration
agreements that an "attack on the confidentiality provision is ... an attack on the
character of arbitration itself."' 05 The Second Circuit then deferred to the reason-
ing of the Supreme Court, that generalized attacks such as the one brought by
Guyden "rest on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protection
afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants" and, as such, are in
conflict with the Supreme Court's strong endorsement of arbitration as a means to
resolve federal disputes. 1 6 Therefore, because the court had upheld the arbitrabil-
ity of whistleblower claims generally, and because confidentiality "is a paradig-
matic aspect of arbitration," the challenge to the confidentiality provision was
precluded. 017
Additionally, Guyden challenged the enforceability of the "brief summary"
provision of the agreement. I08 Guyden argued that the provision would prevent
her from obtaining effective judicial review of the arbitrator's decision because,
due to the brevity of the summary, the arbitrator would be free to ignore the law
because "no one would be the wiser.'1 9 The Second Circuit quickly rejected that
challenge by reasoning that it was based on an unsupported assumption that the
arbitrator would "knowingly refuse or fail to apply controlling law and then insu-
late that failure from review through the form of its written decision."'' 0
Guyden's third challenge to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement
was directed at its limited discovery provision."' Guyden argued that she would
need access to third-party discovery, subpoenas, and document production in
excess of what was provided for in the agreement." 2 Aetna's counterargument
was that the arbitrator could allow for additional discovery provided Guyden
102. Id.
103. Id. For the text of the confidentiality agreement see supra, text accompanying note 28.
104. Id. at 385.
105. Id. (quoting Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175 (5th Cir.
2004) (holding that a confidentiality provision did not render an arbitration agreement unconsciona-
ble)).
106. Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (holding that
Congress did not intend to preclude arbitration of ADEA claims)).
107. Id.
108. Id. For the text of the brief summary provision see Guyden, 544 F.3d at 381.
109. Id.
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showed it was necessary. 1 3 In response, Guyden argued that she had limited
resources and would be unable to make the required showing." 14
The Second Circuit first examined the issue without giving consideration to
Guyden's argument that she would be unable to make the required showing to
compel further discovery. 15 The court indicated that the limited discovery provi-
sion contained in the arbitration agreement raised serious questions as to Guy-
den's ability to vindicate her statutory cause of action in arbitration and that a
provision limiting discovery to a deposition of one fact witness might well be
unenforceable. 16 However, because the agreement in this instance gave the arbi-
trator power to order additional discovery upon an adequate showing from the
requesting party, the agreement was enforceable. 117 The court dismissed Guy-
den's argument that she would be unable to meet the standard to compel further
discovery because the argument was based on her unfounded fear that the arbitra-
tor would not permit her request for further discovery.' 
18
C. Summary of the Second Circuit's Opinion
In reaching its holding, the Second Circuit reasoned that the controlling con-
gressional purpose for review in this instance was that of the whistleblower provi-
sion, not the purpose of SOX as a whole; as such, no deference need be given to
the broader policies underlying the entire act. 119 After examining the legislative
history behind SOX, the court concluded that the purpose of the whistleblower
protection was to make the whistleblower whole, not to provide a mechanism for
public disclosure.120 Thus, the goal of the whistleblower provision was consistent
with the purposes of arbitration. 121 As a result, the Second Circuit rejected Guy-
den's argument that there was an inherent conflict between the purposes of arbi-
tration and the SOX whistleblower protections. 122 Finding no inherent conflict,
the Second Circuit held that SOX whistleblower claims are arbitrable.1
23
The Second Circuit also rejected all three of Guyden's procedural chal-
lenges.124 In finding the confidentiality provision enforceable, the court reasoned
that because confidentiality provisions are essentially inherent in the arbitration
process, a finding that the dispute is arbitrable precludes Guyden's attack on the
confidentiality agreement. 125 Guyden's argument challenging the brief summary





117. Id. In addition to referencing the terms of the agreement, the court also indicated that the terms
of the FAA would allow the arbitrator to order further discovery, which could render the agreement
enforceable even in the absence of the explicit terms of the agreement allowing for further discovery.
Id. at 386-87.
118. Id. at 387.
119. Id. at 383.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 384.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 384-87.
125. Id. at 384-85.
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relied on an unsupported assumption that the arbitrator would knowingly refuse to
apply the applicable law and use the brevity of his or her findings to shield that
decision from appellate review. 26 The Second Circuit then turned its attention to
the issue of adequate discovery, ruling that because additional discovery was poss-




The Second Circuit in the instant case was presented with a choice: it could
either follow established precedent while performing a rather narrow, though cor-
rect, analysis of the legal issues before it, or it could step back and examine the
wide-ranging consequences of its decision in this case, deciding the case by taking
into account the stated purpose of SOX as a whole. 128 Unfortunately, perhaps, for
the investing public, it elected to take the narrower alternative, and in effect, has
created a loophole which will allow public corporations to effectively bypass the
requirements implemented by SOX.' 2
The consequences of the Second Circuit's decision in this case are alarming.
By allowing publicly held corporations to dispose of whistleblower claims in the
absence of public record, the investing public---the very people SOX is meant to
protect-will lose a key vehicle through which accounting irregularities are ex-
posed. The strongest incentive corporations have to keep honest accounting
records is the fear that irregularities will become public knowledge and trigger an
Enron-like stock collapse.' 30  Many employees will not turn directly to federal
authorities or to the media, but first to their employer, in an attempt to remedy the
problem, therefore becoming a whistleblower and falling under the purview of
SOX.
SOX was enacted in mid-2002, in response to the corporate accounting scan-
dals such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco that rattled the American financial mar-
kets and financial markets the world over.' 31 The general purpose of SOX, as
stated in the Act, is to "protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability
of corporate disclosures."'' 32 The whistleblower provision, by its terms, exists to
provide a remedy for an aggrieved party through which that party can be made
whole.' 33 This purpose, together with the strong rebuke from both houses of Con-
gress in rejecting versions of SOX that removed the possibility of arbitrating whis-
126. Id. at 385-86.
127. Id. at 386-87.
128. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at Statement of Purpose.
129. It is also worth noting that the Second Circuit contains New York, the undisputed financial
capital of the United Sates. Due to the high percentage of Fortune 500 companies whose primary place
of business is in New York, the effects of this decision are likely to be more far-reaching than a typical
Circuit Court decision.
130. Enron stock plummeted from a high of roughly $90 per share in September 2000, to nearly $0
before cessation of trading in December 2001. The Fall of Enron Stock,
http://ca.encarta.msn.comlmedia_701610605/the-fall-of-enronstock.html (last visited Mar. 30,
2009).
131. SHEPPEY & McGILL, supra note 46, at 7.
132. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. 107-204, 107th Congress, 2d Session (Jan. 23, 2002).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(1) (2006).
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tieblower claims,' 34 was the basis for the Second Circuit's reasoning in the instant
decision.
All of SOX's provisions should be interpreted with its general purpose in
mind. Interpreting each piece of an expansive legislation such as SOX without
giving consideration to its main purpose will eventually lead to interpretations of
its parts that are contrary to the purpose of the whole. This is precisely what has
happened in Guyden. By not giving sufficient deference to the purpose of SOX as
a whole, the Second Circuit has created a loophole in securities regulation that
may act as a de facto repeal of SOX. Generally speaking, allowing the arbitration
of whistleblower claims under SOX would not create any such issues. The policy
reasons for favoring arbitration over litigation are many, and a great majority of
them hold up when examined in light of the greater purpose of SOX. These
policies are easily reconcilable with SOX in most instances since utilizing arbitra-
tion instead of litigation essentially only changes the forum of a dispute's resolu-
tion, so long as a plaintiff is able to effectively vindicate his or her statutory rights.
However, the characteristics of the whistleblower provision in this instance
render it significantly opposed to the policies underlying SOX in that the arbitra-
tion proceedings under the instant agreement are to be kept confidential. 36 This
requirement of confidentiality is not reconcilable with the greater purpose of SOX.
While arbitration should be a satisfactory method of resolving SOX whistleblower
claims, allowing confidential arbitration threatens to create an exception to SOX
that swallows the rule.
If fraud permeates a company to the point where senior management is in-
volved, this ruling could render SOX compliance, and the investor reassurance
that accompanies it, a thing of the past. If an employee uncovers an irregularity
and reports it to his or her supervisor-a likely scenario if the employee simply
stumbles across what she believes is a simple accounting mistake-what incentive
is there for the company to change? Relying on Guyden, the company could
simply discharge the whistleblower and handle any claims against it in a confiden-
tial arbitration. The whistleblower would be compensated for her troubles in the
form of back pay and other compensatory damages, but the matter would remain
confidential, escaping the realm of public knowledge. 37 While, theoretically, the
employee could go public with her claim following the arbitration, she is unlikely
to do so in the presence of a confidentiality clause for fear that the corporation
will bring an action against her, threatening her livelihood.
Sherron Watkins and Cynthia Cooper, the whistleblowers at Enron and
WorldCom, respectively, both alerted higher-ups within their own firms, not a
134. See supra, text accompanying notes 57-59.
135. Policies such as lightening the docket of the courts and speedy resolution of disputes are well
served by arbitration, and generally speaking provide no inconsistencies with the purpose of SOX.
136. See Guyden, 544 F.3d at 381, 384.
137. Though beyond the purview of this note, the author feels it is worth examining the legal effect of
a confidential arbitration agreement on a former employee's stock ownership in the company. For
instance, if an employee is discharged for blowing the whistle on accounting irregularities and is sub-
ject to a confidential arbitration agreement, is that employee allowed to divest his or her stake in the
company, or would such a divestment subject the employee to criminal and civil liability under federal
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government organization or media outlet. 138 Suppose Ms. Watkins had been ter-
minated as a result of her actions, and was subject to the arbitration agreement in
the instant case. 139 Enron might have only had to deal with the arbitration of her
individual claim, leading to a judgment against it in the form of compensatory
damages awarded to Ms. Watkins. The information uncovered during the arbitra-
tion, however, would remain private unless Ms. Watkins elected to violate the
confidentiality agreement, exposing herself to litigation. While Enron likely
would have failed anyway, it would have been able to further perpetrate its fraud,
exposing even more investors to the titanic losses that would ultimately take
place, leaving an even larger scar on the American economy.
Under a system that results in a public record, either through a trial record or
an arbitration proceeding transcript, there is an incentive for corporations to comp-
ly with SOX. If the element of public disclosure is greatly diminished from the
risk-reward calculus via a confidential arbitration agreement, a financial incentive
for non-compliance begins to form. According to basic management theory, a
firm should undertake projects that result in a positive expected present value
("EPV").' 40 When presented with mutually exclusive options (such as compliance
or non-compliance), a manager will take the action that results in the highest EPV
for his or her firm. Under a system with public disclosure, the chances of being
able to achieve a benefit from non-compliance that would create a positive EPV
are minimal, as the risk of public disclosure of the company's non-compliance
would be significant. On the other hand, in a system where non-compliant con-
duct is highly unlikely to be exposed, it is more likely that such conduct will result
in a positive EPV; essentially, as the chances of getting caught cheating decrease,
the potential gain from the illegitimate conduct outweighs the potential harm that
would result from getting caught.
The purpose of the SOX as a whole is clear based both on its language and
timing. SOX was enacted to protect the investing public in the wake of multiple
corporate accounting disasters. While it is true that the whistleblower provision
exists to make the whistleblower whole in the event of an adverse employment
action, and to a lesser extent, true that arbitration in the instant controversy pro-
vides the plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to vindicate her statutory rights,
the Second Circuit should have examined the secondary consequences of its deci-
sion. The instant decision missed the forest for the trees. While the court focused
exclusively on the consequences of its decision on the instant dispute, it missed
the wider ramifications of its decision. The Second Circuit has created an excep-
tion--in the form of confidential arbitration agreements--that threatens to be a de
facto repeal of The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002.
Though the loophole created by the Second Circuit in this decision has the
potential to be enormous, an efficient remedy to this potential problem is not out
of reach. The most efficient way to remedy this situation is simply for Congress
to add a single line to the text of SOX, declaring that arbitration of whistleblower
claims under SOX is indeed permissible, but that no arbitration agreement may
138. See Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 5.
139. This is not what happened, and is merely a hypothetical situation presented by the author.
140. John Edmunds & Roberto Bonifaz, Expected Present Value, in THE CONCISE BLACKWELL




Eckelkamp: Eckelkamp: Confidential Arbitration of Whistleblower Actions
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
include a confidentiality clause that would limit the investing public's access to
material accounting information. A congressional remedy is necessary due to the
time that would be required for the Supreme Court to resolve the issue through the
appeals process. The time delay involved would provide ample opportunity for
unethical managers to create a new wave of creative accounting scandals. Such a
timely congressional solution satisfies both the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration of disputes and the intended protections of SOX; it directs an increas-
ing number of disputes to arbitration, while at the same time, provides a mechan-
ism through which the investing public may discover important accounting irregu-
larities.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, through its ruling in Guyden v. Aetna,
Inc., has opened the door to a de facto repeal of one of the most noteworthy pieces
of legislation of the twenty-first century. It is apparent that the purpose of SOX as
a whole was to restore the confidence of the investing public through assurance of
the accuracy of corporate financial records. By examining Guyden's challenge to
her confidential arbitration agreement without deference to this overall purpose,
the court has created a loophole that threatens to overtake the rule.
The court is correct in its conclusion that arbitration of whistleblower claims,
generally speaking, is not contrary to the purpose of SOX. Furthermore, it is cor-
rect in its determination that a confidential arbitration agreement satisfies the pur-
poses of the whistleblower provision of SOX, so long as the claimant is able to
properly vindicate rights afforded to him or her under the law. The Second Cir-
cuit erred, however, in not examining the effect of enforcing a confidential arbitra-
tion agreement of a whistleblower claim in light of the purpose of SOX as a
whole.
By not considering the big picture, the Second Circuit has endorsed a vehicle
through which companies may quietly and efficiently dispose of whistleblower
actions. If a fraudulent system is perpetuated by a firm on enough corporate le-
vels, as it was at Enron and WorldCom, the company may be able to terminate the
whistleblower and keep all procedures relating to that termination in-house. Un-
less the whistleblower is inclined to violate his or her confidentiality agreement,
thereby risking exposure to litigation, this information will never become public.
Without the threat of accounting irregularities becoming public knowledge, there
is less incentive to comply with SOX, and SOX's goals are eroded.
Unfortunately, the Second Circuit did not step back and look at the ramifica-
tions of its decision in this case. This is a troubling result for all of us. Any po-
tential resurgence of investor confidence in the integrity and accuracy of corporate
financial reporting may slow because of this decision. As a result, it may take
even longer for the American financial markets, which are presently suffering
from a new wave of gross financial mismanagement, to recover. Due to the
Second Circuit's decision in this case, there now exists a way for companies to
legally circumvent the regulations created by SOX, which has the potential to lead
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